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Vulnerability: Too Vague and Too Broad?
DORIS SCHROEDER and EUGENIJUS GEFENAS
Introduction
Imagine you are walking down a city street. It is windy and raining. Amidst
the bustle you see a young woman. She sits under a railway bridge, hardly
protected from the rain and holds a woolen hat containing a small number of
coins. You can see that she trembles from the cold. Or imagine seeing an old
woman walking in the street at dusk, clutching her bag with one hand and
a walking stick with the other. A group of male youths walk behind her
without overtaking, drunk and in the mood for mischief. It doesn’t need an
academic to say what vulnerability is. We can all see it, much more often than
we care to.
Vulnerability is an important concept in bioethics because vulnerable groups
are prone to exploitation in medical research, that is, they are easily taken unfair
advantage of to serve another’s interests.1 As such exploitation is morally
wrong,2 all major international research guidelines demand measures to protect
the vulnerable. It is surprising, then, that such an important concept should still
face two major challenges in the early 21st century.
First, it has been argued that the concept of vulnerability remains vague3 and
even that the ‘‘definition of vulnerability for the purposes of healthcare and
research with human participants is . . . an unanswered question.’’4 Second, it has
been argued that the categories of vulnerable populations have been expanded so
widely that almost everybody is included. As a result, the special protection
reserved for genuinely vulnerable populations is being lost.5
This paper tries to help remedy the situation in two ways: first, by outlining
a definition of vulnerability in response to the ‘‘unanswered question,’’ namely,
how vulnerability can be defined meaningfully within the research context, and
second, by arguing that vulnerability assessments need to take closer account of
identifiable markers for significant harms as opposed to proclaiming universal
classifications.
Vulnerability Definition: The Common Sense View
In attempting to provide a meaningful definition of vulnerability, we proceed
from a commonsense position before moving into research ethics. We thereby
hope to achieve broader understanding and consensus among the many groups
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who are involved in protecting vulnerable individuals (e.g., healthcare personnel,
lawyers, and policymakers).
Defining vulnerability can be likened to the efforts of six blind men describing
an elephant.6 In this South Asian legend, six blind men touch different parts of an
elephant, the tusk, the trunk, the ear, the tail, and so forth. And when they try to
describe the entity, they cannot agree. The moral of the story is that, depending
on one’s perspective, one may only be able to describe half-truths. So, what could
it mean to be vulnerable?7
According to the New Oxford Dictionary of English, to be vulnerable means
‘‘to be exposed to the possibility of being attacked or harmed, either physically or
emotionally.’’ As synonyms for vulnerable, the thesaurus offers ‘‘defenseless,
liable, imperfect, unprepared, frail, susceptible, weak, helpless, open to, exposed,
in danger, at risk.’’ Due to its Latin origin (vulnerare 5 to wound), many Eu-
ropean languages use the same term (e.g., French, vulne´rable, Italian, vulnerabile).
Germanic languages, by contrast, express the meaning directly. For instance,
verletzlich and verwundbar could be translated literally as ‘‘injurable’’ or ‘‘wound-
able.’’ The commonsense definition of vulnerability is therefore as follows:
Dictionary Definition of Vulnerability
To be vulnerable means to be exposed to the possibility of being
attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally.
Vulnerability Definition in Research Ethics
The generic dictionary definition stands in marked contrast to a definition
frequently used within international research ethics. The Council for Interna-
tional Organizations of Medical Science (CIOMS) notes on vulnerability as
follows:
‘‘Vulnerability’’ refers to a substantial incapacity to protect one’s own
interests owing to such impediments as lack of capability to give
informed consent, lack of alternative means of obtaining medical care,
. . . or being a junior or subordinate member of a hierarchical group.8
In a later section, CIOMS clarifies that those with a substantial incapacity to
protect their own interests are likely to lack power, intelligence, education,
resources, or strength. Whereas the dictionary definition focuses on external
factors, namely, the danger of being attacked, the CIOMS definition focuses on
internal factors, namely, the inability to protect oneself. We argue in the following
that a combination of both is required. But first, the short version of the CIOMS
vulnerability definition is as follows:
CIOMS Definition of Vulnerability
To be vulnerable means to be substantially incapable of protecting
one’s own interests.
Doris Schroeder and Eugenijus Gefenas
114
Vulnerability Definition: Combining Common Sense and Research Ethics
In the Leviathan Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) famously describes human life
outside the protection of law as ‘‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’’9
Hobbes reasons that the weakest human being has enough strength to kill the
strongest, either through ‘‘the use of secret machination or by confederacy with
others.’’10 As a result, Hobbes claims that we are all exposed to the possibility of
being attacked or harmed, even violently killed, unless we are being protected.
Yet it would be unreasonable to maintain that all human beings are exposed to
the possibility of harm to the same degree. For instance, this paper is written as
part of a European-funded research project with partners and advisors from
around the world. However, as shown in Table 1, looking at our statistical
chances of having been killed at a young age (10–29), we see that they vary
enormously.
These statistics show that an Australian youth is twice as likely to be violently
killed than his or her German equivalent, yet almost 10 times (!!) less likely than his
or her counterpart in Mexico. In this regard, youths in Mexico are most exposed to
the possibility of death by homicide among the countries listed. Because exposure
to the possibility of harm equals vulnerability according to the dictionary
definition, can one say that youth in Mexico are most vulnerable to homicide
(of the countries listed)? Yes one could. However, using the term vulnerability in
this sense aligns it too closely with danger and thereby veils another element,
namely, an inability to protect oneself as outlined by the CIOMS definition.
Let us explain the binary composition of vulnerability with reference to ma-
laria. Human beings are not invincible; we all suffer from harm during our lives.
As bioethicist Nancy Jecker notes: ‘‘All persons are made of ‘flesh’ not steel.’’11
One such potential harm is the bite from a malaria-carrying mosquito and the
subsequent exposure to the malaria parasite. We are all fragile in the sense that it
would be better for our health not to be exposed to the parasite. However, as
Northern and Eastern Europeans, we, the authors, are not exposed to the
possibility of contracting the disease, unless we travel. If we stay in our countries
of birth, our risk of contracting malaria is zero (point 1: exposure to potential
harm, i.e., danger). Let us assume, however, that we do travel. Because we
understand the options for malaria prevention and have the means to access or
Table 1. Homicide Rates among Youths, Aged 10–29 Years, for Most Recent Year Available
Deaths per 100,000 population
France 0.6
Germany 0.8
Greece 0.9
United Kingdom 0.9
Italy 1.4
Australia 1.6
Lithuania 5.4
Philippines 12.2
Mexico 15.3
No data available from Africa. Source: World Health Organization.World Report on Violence
and Health, Geneva: World Health Organization; 2002:28f.
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pay for them, we are fortunate, as we can protect ourselves from malaria (point 2:
protection possibilities). Others are not so fortunate. A definition of vulnerability
needs to combine the above two elements; the fragility of the human condition
that exposes us all to the possibility of harm and the potential inability to protect
ourselves. Importantly, the distinction is also relevant to policymakers, who can
aim at reducing exposure to harm (e.g., eradicate the malaria parasite) or im-
proving people’s protective capacity (e.g., supply malaria nets).
This means that our first draft definition of being vulnerable could be as
follows:
To be vulnerable means to be exposed to the possibility of harm while
being substantially unable to protect oneself.
This definition combines an internal and an external element. First, to be vul-
nerable one has to be exposed to the possibility of harm, that is, danger (external
element of vulnerability). It does not make sense to say that ‘‘the inhabitants of
Cologne are vulnerable to malaria.’’ A genuine danger is required for vulnera-
bility to materialize. Second, to be vulnerable one has to be substantially unable
to protect oneself (internal element of vulnerability). Exposure to danger alone is
not what makes a person vulnerable. For instance, even when somebody is set to
assassinate another person, the intended victim might have means of protecting
herself, which renders her invulnerable to the assassination attempt. She could be
sitting in a bullet-proof car with a bullet-proof vest, having been warned that an
assassination might take place. In this case, she would not be vulnerable because
she is able to protect herself against the danger. Vulnerability requires both
internal and external elements.
In the next step, the above definition needs to be refined by moving closer to
the topic of research ethics and including reasons for one’s potential incapacity
to protect oneself.12 Bioethicists distinguish between intrinsic and contingent
reasons why some subjects might be unable to protect themselves. For instance,
children and the severely mentally ill are ‘‘incompetent to determine their own
good. They are, therefore, intrinsically vulnerable to exploitation’’ within the
research setting.13 It is simply impossible for them to give informed consent.
They inherently lack the decisionmaking capacity to do so. One could say they
lack the ability to protect themselves. By contrast, illiterate and destitute adults
‘‘are competent to exercise self-determination. . . . Yet political, social, or economic
circumstances make them easily victimized. . . . They are, therefore, contingently
vulnerable to exploitation’’14 within the research setting. A person who is unable
to protect herself because she cannot read and because she might enroll in a risky
study as her only means to access healthcare would probably be able to protect
herself if her social and economic circumstances changed. One could say she
lacks the means to protect herself, leading to the following refined definition:15
To be vulnerable means to be exposed to the possibility of harm while
substantially lacking ability and/or means to protect oneself.
An objection that could be made against our definition is the following. Does our
external element (exposure to the possibility of harm) not equate with the
fragility of the human condition? Are we not all exposed to the possibility of
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harm? Indeed, we are. In this regard the dictionary definition lacks precision
when used in the research ethics context. Special protection should not be
accorded to humankind as a whole, based on fragility, but to those who are at an
identifiable risk of being exploited in medical research. A thus refined and final
definition would therefore be the following:
Our Definition of Vulnerability
To be vulnerable means to face a significant probability of incurring
an identifiable harm while substantially lacking ability and/or means
to protect oneself.
Having developed a definition such as this one, will it now be easier to protect
the vulnerable in the medical research context? This would be rather optimistic to
proclaim. There are two main practical obstacles, which a concise definition
cannot resolve. First, as we observed using the statistics on homicide rates among
youths, exposure to the possibility of harm comes in degrees. Even though
violent death could befall a teenager in a Bavarian village, it is much more likely
to occur in a city in Mexico. Overemphasizing the danger of being a teenager
could then lead to an unnecessary expansion of vulnerable groups, disregarding
relative risks in favor of group categorizations. Second, although none of us are
made of steel, as Jecker rightly noted, we are not all exposed to the same dangers.
As pointed out earlier, in Cologne one does not need protection from the malaria
parasite. Ideally, nominations of vulnerable groups should therefore stand in
relation to identifiable, possible harms. We shall return to these two practical
problems in the identification of vulnerable groups after introducing the second
challenge for the concept of vulnerability.
Too Broad a Concept?
It has been argued that the categories of vulnerable populations have been
expanded so widely that the special protection reserved for vulnerable popula-
tions is being lost. This criticism was raised with reference to the latest
amendment of the World Medical Association’s (WMA) Declaration of Helsinki.
The Declaration does not define vulnerability but instead categorizes vulnerable
groups very broadly in Article 8:
Some research populations are vulnerable and need special protection.
The particular needs of the economically and medically disadvantaged
must be recognized. Special attention is also required for those who
cannot give or refuse consent for themselves, for those who may be
subject to giving consent under duress, for those who will not benefit
personally from the research and for those for whom the research is
combined with care.16
The above guideline pronounces groups as vulnerable per se, irrespective of
identifiable possible harms. If one looks at the above description of vulnerable
populations, one can indeed wonder who is not vulnerable in medical research.
As Forster, Emanuel, and Grady commented:
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The new declaration goes further [than the old one], making every
conceivable person vulnerable, from patients with an illness, to those
who cannot give consent, to healthy volunteers. . . . The new declaration
expands the category of vulnerability so broadly that it eliminates this
category; . . . if everyone is vulnerable, no one is entitled to special
protection.17
In a table compiled in 2008, Samia Hurst listed the following groups as
vulnerable populations contained in international guidelines: racial minorities,
the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, children, prisoners, pregnant
women, fetuses, healthy volunteers, those with mental or behavioral disorders,
junior members of hierarchical groups, elderly persons, those in nursing homes,
people receiving welfare benefits, the unemployed, patients in emergency rooms,
homeless persons, nomads, refugees, patients with incurable diseases, members
of communities unfamiliar with modern medical concepts, individuals who are
politically powerless, and those who take part in research while in clinical care.18
The above notes on our definition might contribute to explaining why vul-
nerable groups proliferate. It is difficult to determine exactly when a degree of
vulnerability is part of the fragility of the human condition or when it is so
pronounced that special protection mechanisms are required. In other words,
when are our relative risks or our inability to protect ourselves significant enough
to warrant protection? The unemployed in Sweden might be at a higher risk of
exploitation than the employed in this country, but do they really require special
protection mechanisms when involved in research? They already enjoy the
benefits of a comprehensive, protective net spun by their state. What, then, is
the significant probability of their incurring an identifiable harm through re-
search? On the other hand, if people are unemployed in Zimbabwe, where such
a welfare net does not exist, the possibility that they might enroll in exploitative
research for meager benefits such as a health check or the provision of meals is
indeed a concern. The two groups share one label, ‘‘unemployed,’’ but one enjoys
the benefit of state protection, which Hobbes celebrated, whereas the other does
not. This is similar to the problem David Resnik has identified when arguing that
categorically pronouncing an expanding number of groups as vulnerable can
easily lead to false categorizations.
If one regards all research subjects in the developing world as
vulnerable, then one should provide the same protections for a white,
male, urban businessman from South Africa and a black, female villager
from Ethiopia. . . . Treating all subjects in developing nations as
vulnerable is like treating all women as vulnerable.19
The white urban businessman from South Africa does not face a significant
probability of incurring an identifiable harm when enrolling in medical research.
He has the literacy, knowledge, and income levels to protect himself against
exploitation. But he is part of a category (developing country participant), which
includes a large number of vulnerable individuals due to serious economic
disadvantage.
False categorizations are not the only complication in the attempt to identify
vulnerable individuals through the use of group categorizations. At the same
time, we are not all exposed to the same dangers; neither does all research
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involve similar risks. Ideally, the protection of vulnerable groups should stand in
relation to identifiable possible harms.
To give an example, we cannot list all possible identifiable harms that can befall
subjects in research (we take harms to include violations of human rights to well-
being, autonomy, and justice). But we can give reliable markers for the incurrence
of identifiable harm within the research context. These are:
1) Unfavorable risk/benefit ratio
2) Breach of confidentiality or privacy
3) Invalid consent
4) Lack of access to the benefits of research.
An unfavorable risk/benefit ratio can impact directly a person’s well-being (a
terminally ill patient undergoing a painful procedure with minute chances of
improvement).20 A breach of confidentiality or privacy can impact well-being
(paternity suits, stigma) or autonomy. Invalid consent falls into the realm of
autonomy (with insufficient information, a research participant may take part in
research she opposes on principle) and also covers undue inducement. Lack of
access to the benefits of research is a justice issue, which has been noted in
redrafts of the Declaration of Helsinki (Art. 30).21 Those taking part in research
must be assured of access to any successfully marketed products (post-trial
obligations), which must be relevant to local health needs.
Let us look at two different studies to see the difficulty of pronouncing groups
as vulnerable independent from the significant probability of incurring an iden-
tifiable harm. Our examples are both set in the area of vaccine research. On the
one hand, we have healthy volunteers in the United Kingdom who are taking
part in a clinical trial Phase I. On the other hand, we have Kenyan sex workers,
taking part in the search for a candidate vaccine for HIV by providing access to
blood samples for genetic research, which are used for health monitoring. Both
groups are considered vulnerable according to the latest version of the Declara-
tion of Helsinki (not benefiting personally from the research; economically
disadvantaged). To avoid breaches of confidentiality, we assume that all data
stored with regard to the participants will be made untraceable.
Let us look at our four markers for identifiable potential harms. For a healthy
volunteer, to take part in a clinical trial Phase I to test a new AIDS vaccine
involves an unfavorable risk/benefit ratio. By contrast, allowing access to blood
samples, which were taken for health monitoring, poses no risk to well-being. We
excluded the possibility of breaches of confidentiality in both cases. All research
projects carry the risk of invalid consent. In our case, the healthy volunteers
might not understand the risk they are taking and potentially illiterate Nairobi
sex workers might suffer from the therapeutic misconception of assuming that
the use of their blood samples will lead to health benefits for them. The chances
that the UK participants will not have access to the fruits of medical research are
almost zero, given the coverage of the National Health Service. On the other
hand, the likelihood that the sex workers will not have access to a future HIV
vaccine are very high, given that they are extremely poor and that post-trial
obligations are currently not enforceable. Hence, both the healthy volunteers and
the sex workers are vulnerable with regard to two identifiable markers for harm.
The healthy volunteers could face an unfavorable risk/benefit ratio and invalid
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consent. The sex workers could encounter invalid consent and lack of access to
the benefits of research.
Let us now reverse the studies and undertake the vaccine clinical trial Phase I
on Kenyan sex workers and the genetic research on UK healthy volunteers.
Through this reversal, the sex workers suddenly face three identifiable markers
for harm (unfavorable risk/benefit ratio, invalid consent, lack of access to the
benefits of research) whereas the healthy volunteers face only one (invalid
consent).
We noted earlier that we are not all exposed to the same dangers; neither does
all research involve similar risks. What the example shows is that some vul-
nerable groups face a significant probability of incurring more identifiable harms
in the same study. In most cases, the additional identifiable marker for harm will
be a justice concern, namely, that those who are taking part in research do not
share in its potential benefits. Discussions about vulnerable populations should
therefore note that some vulnerable groups can face the entire spectrum of
identifiable markers for harm, whereas others do not. This leaves us with three
challenges for future work:
1) How to address the justice concern within vulnerability discussions, which
have for decades focused mostly on autonomy concerns. It is here that the
topic of benefit sharing will gain importance.
2) How group specifications can be made more sensitive to individual
circumstances to avoid false categorizations.
3) How to move forward with a harm-specific analysis of vulnerability should
this help resolve the problem of false categorizations.
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